FROM THE MEDIA

Suedosteuropa Mitteilungen
February, 2002

Zoran Đinđić, Ph D
Prime Minister of Serbia

The mere fact that a manifestation that has nothing to do with Afghanistan has created such great interest is truly gratifying. Another good thing is that the Balkans is no longer being talked about as the number one crisis in the world. This rarely happened in the past. We can hardly recall a crisis that had not begun or ended in the Balkans in the last two centuries. This time we shall not talk about the chain of crisis reactions, but about structural problems in the Balkans, about strategies, and not about crisis management, but prevention, and in a more relaxed atmosphere at that. What can we do to keep the situation intact? It is fine that now, just a year later, we are able to discuss these matters on a scientific basis. Were we to discuss this subject a year or just a month ago, the tone of our discussion would have been different and we would have had fewer reasons for optimism.

If we are to discuss the concrete subject of Yugoslavia, Serbia and the region, then we should be able to impart some good news and some less gratifying news. The good news is that for the first time in history, all the countries in the neighbourhood of Serbia and Yugoslavia have democratically elected governments. This has now become so normal that we no longer thoroughly appreciate it, but take it for granted. It is certainly not customary that individuals who may not be the very best, but have been elected, are sitting in the governments of Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, and now Serbia. Perhaps even the elections were not conducted quite correctly or fairly, but they were, on the whole, democratic. The persons occupying these chairs are not interested now in violence but are concerned about other problems; they are not obsessed with conspiracies from abroad nor are they involved in any, but, like all other democratic politicians in Europe they are simply putting all their efforts in these countries. This is a very good thing and I do hope that it will continue this way. When we took power in Belgrade, on 5 October 2000, and placed the last fragment in the mosaic, the situation was most positive. All the countries around us had governments involved in reforms. This, too, was good news.

It is less pleasing that almost all the governments of these countries have since been recalled. They have all suffered election defeats this year or are undergoing critical times. In Romania, the government and the president were replaced by others at the elections. In Bulgaria, the king won the parliamentary (Assembly) elections, whereas the communists won the presidential elections, an unusual combination, indeed. In Macedonia, which was actually a model of ethnic life together displaying balanced interests between the Slav majority and the Albanian minority, we now have a pre-war and post-war situation. It cannot be said what will happen, because the government is unstable, divided from within and under considerable pressure from Albanian political groups. One cannot foresee what will happen to this country in the future. Then, Montenegro, which, to my mind, appeared to be a model country open to reform, with a courageous leadership that opposed Milošević in exceedingly difficult circumstances, continues to be deeply divided over something that does not concern democracy or no-democracy, or even Europe or anti-Europe as alternatives. The question in this case is independence or staying in the Federation with Serbia. Regardless of how this problem is resolved, the nation will continue to be divided. Unless the politicians make up, it will be impossible to govern the country for some time to come. No matter what the majority is, the minority will still be strong enough to bring into question every decision the majority makes, regardless of whether it concerns the water supply system, communal responsibilities or the budget. Quite a shift will have to be made in the foundations of the State, which is not a positive thing. Bosnia is not as stable as it was a year ago. In Croatia, the reforms are not really exemplary as had been expected. Things are going well only in Hungary which actually does not belong in this region. The Hungarians will have their elections in April 2002 and, up until then things will be going well for them. Perhaps, after the elections, Hungary will join the countries whose reform governments did not pass the elections fa-vourably.

This means that something is happening in the region. Beginner’s luck, which had been the source of a real euphoria, has been relatively brought down to size. Indeed, nothing is really so stable. We do not have wars any more, but neither do we have normal development geared towards Europe, towards reforms that authoritative international organizations like the Monetary Fund or World Bank would welcome and take into consideration. The groups that had conducted these reforms are no longer in power. This gives one the following impression: if you get a good mark abroad, they turn you down at home. This is rather disturbing especially when our government, for instance, has continually been getting fine marks from the World Bank.

There is something destabilizing in the Balkans, and Europe should already contemplate how to project and develop a strategy, which, despite the changes occurring in this region, would have an appeasing effect and, we hope, for some time ahead, in this century at least, would ensure that there be no more wars or upheavals.

Why have the Balkans been so unstable throughout history? You know as well as I do that there are many reasons for this. A major cause is the eternal strife existing between state and nation in the region, in my opinion, because our forefathers had not succeeded in finding a concept of statehood that would not rest on national statehood. As a model, national statehood has always incited disturbances. Since the territories of the states were never sufficiently populated by one particular nation, the concept of national statehood was a continual source of disruption. Thus there were always claims to the same territories from various sides, causing ethnic or national conflict because one national state excludes another nation in the same territory. The question has always been who is it that is setting up a national state at someone else’s expense, after which one could only wait for the next war to start and destroy the existing set-up.

An elderly historian from Sarajevo, who may not be alive any more, wrote some twenty years ago that there were probably reasons why the German Emperor declared war on the Czar of Russia or vice-versa, which is something that can still be argued, but I just wonder why is it that we in the Balkans have always banged each other up on these occasions. Whenever someone somewhere in the world declares war on someone, we also engage in war. The question: Why? The reason is that there is always some unsettled account from the past that needs to be settled and a crisis is awaited in order to do this. The question now is: Do such accounts still exist and do we have to fear that when the next world crisis breaks out, we shall again try to settle them? As to my opening words about Afghanistan, which was supposed to be a joke, really, there is reason to be at ease. We have a crisis in the world but it has not had any repercussions here; no one is overly interested in it, neither in the region, nor in the country. So, we are not thinking of taking advantage of this crisis in the world, either to misuse it or to settle any internal accounts. Presently, we are caring only about our own business.

In principle, there are so many open questions reminding us of the old nation-state dilemma which are most dangerous: for us in Serbia, it is the question of Serbian and Montenegrin statehood, the question of Kosovo, southern Serbia, the Albanian question, decentralization in Serbia – meaning the question of Vojvodina – many questions pertaining to autonomy, all of which can easily be abused. These are all issues that have at least one root strung to some dark myth and any skilful demagogue – and they are very skilful in our country – could well open again some Pandora’s box and we shall have yet another crisis on our hands and fresh problems.

As a government and as a broadly based coalition that had taken responsibility on itself in October 2000, we were, and still are, aware that we shall always meet with minefields no matter what direction we take. That we must take care since it is a question of life and death. Montenegro, Kosovo, southern Serbia, at the time in turmoil, are now, thank God, peaceful. We then developed a tactics to keep these issues under control. The tactics comprised two or three points. The first was that issues and problems should be de-emotionalized. This is an ugly word but it simply means trying to talk about these matters in a boring and highly professional way so as not to anger or upset people. For instance, if Montenegro is mentioned, then we must not provoke some to jump up and say that they cannot allow the secessionists to break away, or others to say they do not want to live under Serbia and the Serb heel, but prompt the question: What would it cost and what are the consequences; is it a good thing or bad; who is it good for and for whom is it bad? Such a dialogue has a therapeutic effect. People are apt to rid themselves of negative en-ergy when involved in a discussion.

Then, unimaginable as it is, it did succeed: these are topics that are presently being discussed in a relaxed manner, at least in Belgrade, perhaps somewhat less so in Podgorica. This is not by chance: we tried starting up a discourse, daily discussions, calmly debating the future of the State, secession and non-secession. The future of the Yugoslav State or of an independent Serbia is being discussed in our country now as a rational topic. In the way adults talk about getting a divorce. We may not have children, or perhaps we do have some. Are they ours or not, it is difficult to say, but we do have something common to both: our history and tradition. This is our reasoning, but if others are not of the same opinion, then we shall say: very well, we have no children in common. There is a consensus of opinion in Belgrade that the people of Montenegro should decide on the question of independence and that we will respect their decision. This is something, and it is already an achievement. But we say, and this is no joke: the only interest we have is that they make their decision soon, possibly in April or May 2002.¹

If the majority should decide on the matter let them inform us and we will accept it and, as the State of Serbia, take it into account. We ourselves, nevertheless, think that it is less harmful were we to join each other on the road to Europe, but if this is not feasible, then we must accept it, too. In our opinion we have already wasted too much time in the past on internal matters and now we have neither the time nor the energy to spend dividing this country up again, and that Lenin’s motto – a step backwards and two forward – is now somewhat outdated. We would rather take three steps forward, but if this is impossi-ble, well and good.

The next topic which was opened and which we de-emotionalized is Kosovo and it is truly remarkable that we managed to do this. This does not mean that we are unconcerned about the issue, but that we have come to realize that we cannot resolve such difficult questions if emotions are involved. We succeeded in getting the Serbs, some of whom were expelled from Kosovo and some who are still living in Kosovo, to take part in the elections there. At the same time we explained that the elections would not solve anything and that they must not have any great expectations. It was not easy to pronounce at one and the same time: take part but don’t expect much, we cannot solve the problem; the elections will not get you home; there is no secure existence, but still: participate. A good 58% went to the polls and thus fulfilled a major precondition: to ensure that the institutions may continue to negotiate, that we now have the legal institutions and that, as the government in Belgrade, as an institution, as a party, we can look for collocutors. We are now prepared to continue this dialogue, to discuss with the Albanians sitting in these institutions and simply ask them: What is, actually, the priority? And, just as we had in the case of Montenegro, ask further: If independent Kosovo is a priority, what does this mean? In our opinion this would simply prolong a crisis reaction: it would bring Macedonia into question and the Bosnian concept as such would also be jeopardized. If a state comes into existence based on an ethnic political group, why then would yet another not be founded? What is the purpose of a multi-ethnic Bosnia if Kosovo should become independent as a result of its radical policy? This would then drag along with it the problem of two Albanian States in the middle of Europe – Albania and Kosovo – which are not necessarily compatible. It would mean that many problems would arise and an additional one for the Albanian population. Namely, its entry into Europe, which is via Serbia, will be blocked for a time. Such radicalism would, in addition, incite the Serb population to negative politicizing, which would again isolate this potential Albanian State for who knows how long. Can this be the interest, or would it sooner be in the inter-est of all to seek a way to Europe in a coordinated manner?

Southern Serbia is the next problem. Armed conflicts were spattering there at the time we came into power, with policemen being shot at. We succeeded in keeping these police units there, though they were despised on account of what these units did in Kosovo, but we got them not to answer when fired at. Snipers killed twelve policemen, but still there was no return fire. This went on for two or three months until negotiations reached a point when the international community became aware of the situation and intervened. A political solution followed soon after. This was a well-conceived policy, and we recommend it as a political strategy. All problems should be defined as subjects at issue, the consequences of which should be looked into and optional solutions found on the basis of them. Decisions should be based on predictable consequences, not intentions, nor assumed rights, historical rights, least of all. If the consequences are regarded as positive, then the explanation lies there. But, the consequences need to be discussed - democratically discussed with one’s own people in the first place, and the opponents, too, must be given a say, those who hold different views and other options. This is the first point of departure for controlling the inherited instability of the Balkans.

The second point is changing the priorities from the nation and the state to the economy. We won the majority in Serbia in September-October 2000 by convincing people that how they themselves and their families felt was more important than their image of the nation and the state. Real patriotism was when our children stayed in the country and did not leave for good. When we quarrel with Milošević’s opponents, we are able to say: Fine, we quarrel, we are unable to reach a consensus or a compromise, but let us ask what our children think about this. And, when they do say something, we are sure to agree. Their children joined our ranks and we know that. It was not a fair play, but it worked. The decisive factor was that the students and miners joined the demonstrations. They happen to be the two symbols of demagogic socialism. The change of focus directed at the economy carried new substance in the campaign, as well as in daily life. Unfortunately, however, the change of focus was unfavourable for the government, for it could not measure any results or achievements in national and state management, whereas this was feasible in the economic field. Thus, it is possible now to measure what our contribution has been. Milošević ruled for years, but we never knew whether he won or lost his wars? Even today we do not know whether the battle of Kosovo fought six hundred years ago was won or lost, because national wars carry such traits that a battle may have been lost, but historical rights have not. It is a different matter where the economy is concerned: like a bank. At the end of the month one counts one’s earnings and if they are not bigger than in the previous month, then we have not made any profit. If it is bigger, we have gained. And so we come again to the question of objectivizing politics, which has a soothing effect but at the same time puts us under pressure to succeed. If you are interested, we might continue to talk about our economic reform, but I should first like to finish this second point by saying: a change of priority from the nation and the state to the economy has made it possible for people to become motivated and organized by positive subjects and not negative ones as was the case in the past.

The third decisive point is the new model of integration: not of the national state, which in the case of most of the Southeastern European countries did not function, but of European integration. Here, we used the magical words “European integration” and in just a few months this objective swung from neutral to positive in the opinion polls that were conducted. Originally, the West got a negative connotation, NATO was absolutely negative, Germany was so-so, America - one hundred per cent negative. This was in June 2000. European integration at the time stood neutral. Four or five months later, the Serbian population was 60% in favour of European integration. People were beginning to hope that there was a social community where wars were not inescapable, that could be joined and where one could find something like security, stability and a future, some perspective in life. All these points together form our internal strategy, through which the Balkans could attain peace, something that is worth striving for.

The two points elaborated above are, in effect, our main objectives: to prevent problems in our country being demagogically emotionalized and to make the economy, the standard of living, daily necessities, the family and other mainstays the priority. However, as regards the third point - European integration - much will depend on Europe. The question is how does Europe react to this. A question that is still open. Since Greece became a member of the European Union there is a segment missing between Europe and Greece. We assume that as we happen to occupy this section, which means a place for us in the European Union has been foreseen. Five hundred kilometres can be skipped, but they need not be. We can be bypassed via Romania and Bulgaria. But then, the accumulated liability of unresolved Balkan issues would encompass Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. This would be bad - even for Europe. There is no likelihood that on the basis of the European Union’s present criteria, we shall be able to count on this region’s becoming part of the European Union in the next ten or fifteen years. The question is should we leave things as they are and simply say: yes, we have hoodwinked our fellowmen, we’ll never succeed in joining the European family. Or, should this third point be studied and thought over more profoundly. I suggest the latter. I believe that both parties – the European Union and the Balkan countries – will have to exert greater effort.

On our part, we must continue to work as we have in this past year. This means that we must adapt our institutions, the economy, the justice system, finances and so on, to conform with what is considered normal in Europe: to suppress crime, illicit trafficking and trade, smuggling. We should then endeavour to generate regional cooperation to show that we are sufficiently mature for Europe, that we do not want to get on the train alone but are capable of resolving our problems with others. For the region to become an economic space there is a need for regional infrastructure. Energy is one of our problems. Some of the countries have a shortage and some a surplus of energy so something can be arranged in this connection. We have problems with crime that happens to be regional. We have environmental problems, which can only be resolved on a regional basis. This means that there are various points of departure literally craving for the introduction of regional, supra-national structures for their solution and regulation. Our next steps in the two or three years that lie ahead should, therefore, relate to these problems.

More thinking should be done at the European level concerning the new strategy for EU enlargement, which is not just a matter of Europe’s mechanical expansion under the prevailing terms. A “cleaning strategy” at various levels should be undertaken, as for instance: the area between EU membership status and non-EU members can mean much more than just the state of being an aspirant. It can constitute the creation of a single economic space in Europe with the EU as a firm nucleus and other countries, in addition – those that are soon to become members of the EU but presently do not meet the highest EU standards. These countries should be helped to improve their structures, the infrastructure above all, training the labour force, management, legal reform, internal security, etc. This would mean their investing in their own economy. One should calculate how much the troops stationed in Bosnia and in Kosovo cost – they cost fifty times more than all the aid the region is getting. How much have the refugees cost Germany over the last ten years: billions of Deutsche Marks, which is five to ten times what was given in humanitarian aid during this period.

To invest in this region’s stability means saving money in the future. For, should a crisis break out again, it will be a European crisis. One can make this sound more pleasant by saying: it’s in the Balkans, just a half-hour’s flight from Belgrade to Munich. If Hungary belongs to the EU, Serbia is then just across the border, and when we are in Hungary, we are in Germany. If it were necessary, I could, for instance, set out on foot from Belgrade, cross the Hungarian border and from there enter Germany where I could take a job on the black market robbing some professor of his job, which means you will have one more jobless person. This is a threat that should be taken seriously. It means that investment in the stabilization of a given economic space is the proper investment to be made for Europe’s future.

We could move closer to the European Union by way of Balkan integration and reform and I can imagine that in five, six, seven years we may still be standing alongside each other. We can then say: the difference is not so great if one makes a business deal or spends his holiday in Serbia or Croatia or Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia or in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic or some other EU country. This would be an accomplishment of the century! It’s a chance that preceding generations have not had. It is the first time ever in history that the Balkan region – the epicentre of all of Europe’s upheavals – has the chance of being appeased. And I think that we are up to the challenge and taking the chance. We know that it will be worse if we do not seize it. Decadence will follow and disruption, and problems will arise not only for us but the whole of Europe. My message is, therefore: we must not let this chance escape. We need to have Europe’s political support and we will undertake to ensure the strong forces that will be required in the Balkan states to get this process moving and to promote it. And, then, when we see each other again in two or three years’ time, let us hope that we will have made a step in that direction.

¹ The solution reached in March 2002 with EU assistance foresees a loose federation comprising two republics. It is a realistic concept that will preserve the federal state as an international legal subject but at the same time allows the Serbs and Montenegro to enjoy full autonomy in a common state. Total separation would have been a risky option for various reasons: probable confrontation in Montenegro, the question of the status of Kosovo, instability in Bosnia, etc. On the other hand, the federal solution was unrealistic because of the size of the partners (Serbia with 92% and Montenegro 8%). The representatives of the two republics have contractually agreed to harmonize their legislation and gradually make it compatible with EU regulations. Prospects for integration into the EU were ultimately an effective influence in these negotiations. Without such a prospect it would not have been possible to halt the disintegration process in this already turbulent part of Europe (supplemented by the author in April 2002).