The Fragility of Provisional Structures in the Balkans

Cyrill Stieger

In Bosnia, the weapons have been silent for seven years now. Things are quieter in Kosovo too. And in Macedonia no new fighting broke out this past spring between security forces and Albanian rebels, as had been feared by many last autumn. The political solutions imposed on the parties to these conflicts by the European Union and the United States have proved viable so far. Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Albanians - all of them are itching to become parts of Europe, members of the EU and of NATO.

Is the peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia now secure? Has Europe's most crisis-torn region found lasting stability?

The turnaround in Serbia has unquestionably contributed much to the region's pacification. The nationalist excesses of the 1990s, which set Serbia back and spread death and destruction throughout the region, have by and large given way to sober political confrontation, with the emphasis on questions of economic development. But just at this decisive phase of the transformation process, the country is paralyzed by the power struggle between Yugoslav President Kostunica and Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic. Their rivalry, which broke out soon after the overwhelming victory of reform forces in the December 2000 elections, has since developed into open enmity.

Kostunica's party has turned itself into a political opposition force, and has delayed or even prevented passage of some important legislation. In the eyes of his adversaries, Djindjic is a puppet who dances to whatever tune the West pipes. The sense of a new beginning which gripped the Serbian people after the fall of Milosevic has long since evaporated; no economic upswing has materialized, many people are disappointed and disillusioned. The push for reform threatens to bog down even before it has built any real momentum. Nationalists and populists lurk in the shadows, waiting for their hour to strike. Serbia is by no means out of the woods yet.

The internal conflict is compounded by uncertainty about the future of the Yugoslav Federation. This past March, under Western pressure, Serbia and Montenegro signed an agreement about the future shape of their joint state. It is to be called "The Federation of Serbia and Montenegro," and its two segments are to be largely independent. In bringing this about, the EU and USA were trying to prevent a possible Montenegrin secession, fearing that a disintegration of what remains of Yugoslavia could endanger the laboriously established, postwar political order in the entire region. But the restructuring of the Federation is proceeding sluggishly, due to sharply differing ideas about things in Serbia and Montenegro. Here too, Djindjic and Kostunica are not working in concert.

The main thing the plan for a new federation has accomplished is to gain some time. Under it, after a three-year transition period Serbia and Montenegro will have the right to withdraw from the joint state. Should Montenegro take that step, Serbia would be left as the legal successor to Yugoslavia. This would mean that Kosovo would then again be a part of Serbia and no longer, as defined by UN Resolution 1244, part of Yugoslavia. Thus the disintegration of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro would have grave consequences for Kosovo. In such a case, the independence demanded by Kosovo's Albanian majority could hardly be denied. All the effort to maintain Yugoslavia in some viable form constitutes a clear signal to Kosovo's Albanians that the West wants no new states in the Balkans at this time.

"Serbia and Montenegro" constitutes another provisional arrangement, along with those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The progress in Bosnia is undeniable, even though the state as a whole remains an unstable structure and could hardly survive without outside support. But the nationalist parties have been pushed back, and ethnic tensions have softened. It is true that the crucial question of Kosovo's future political status remains open - much to the detriment of the economy. But there is now a president, a cabinet and a parliament, in which even the local Serbs participate. In Macedonia, too, where an escalation of the fighting was prevented last year, the ethnic conflict has shifted to the political arena.

Despite these undeniable signs of progress, the EU and the UN must not slacken in their efforts. The situation remains precarious in Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Macedonia. The provisional governmental structures can be kept alive only with meticulous care and large expenditures. The case of Bosnia illustrates the enormous effort that is needed. The American withdrawal from the UN mission in Bosnia, recently threatened by Washington, would send the wrong signal, even though it would only mean the pullback of a few dozen policemen and would not immediately impact the NATO-led international peacekeeping force. For one thing, the Bosnians have not forgotten the lamentable role played by the Europeans and the UN in the collapse of Tito's Yugoslavia. It was only the American military intervention that ended the war in Bosnia. That is why an American presence is of great symbolic importance there. A withdrawal would lend new impetus to the opponents of the Bosnian state. A second point is that the training of an effective, ethnically mixed police force is one of the most urgent tasks there. Bosnia is no longer threatened by its two neighbors, as it was in the days of Tudjman and Milosevic. The greatest danger to it - and this is also true of Kosovo - comes from organized crime. Washington's dispute with the UN about the International Criminal Court must not be carried out at Bosnia's expense.

Under the impact of the Kosovo war, the European Union held out the long-term prospect of eventual membership to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. This meant that the western Balkans were finally being taken seriously as a part of Europe. In those countries - as was the case in East Central Europe - the prospect of European integration could serve as the motor for political and economic change. However, should the fine words turn out to be no more than consolation for the poor souls left behind, and be forgotten after the forthcoming difficult and exhausting round of EU enlargement, then the political patchwork in the Balkans would be seriously endangered. The prospect of EU membership will lose something of its allure in any case, if the region does not experience tangible improvement sometime soon. And the case of Macedonia has shown how important the prospect of EU membership can be for settling an internal dispute. It was that which gave foreign mediators the leverage with which to exert political influence and thus to end the fighting.

The West must not permit itself to undermine the provisional structures it has itself created. A certain military presence, along with major political and economic commitment (though without any side trips into colonial domination), remain necessary if the fragile postwar order in that part of Europe is to be reinforced and the forces of ethnic politics finally defeated. The integration of minorities, and the creation of governmental institutions under the rule of law which protect all citizens from tyranny, are things which need time, patience and sensitivity.

July 17, 2002 / First published in German, July 13, 2002